Recent Zika Virus (ZIKV) outbreaks in southern Florida have heightened public health concern 28 across the southern United States. As autochthonous (locally-acquired) cases accumulate within the US, 29 policymakers seek early and accurate indicators of self-sustaining transmission to inform intervention 30 efforts in high risk areas. However, given ZIKV's low reporting rates and the geographic variability in 31 both importations and transmission potential, a small cluster of reported cases may reflect diverse 32 scenarios, ranging from multiple self-limiting but independent introductions to a self-sustaining local 33 epidemic. We developed a stochastic model that captures variation and uncertainty in ZIKV case 34 reporting, importations, and transmission, and applied it to assess county-level epidemic risk throughout 
importation scenario, in which the first quarter cases (27) in Texas represent only the 137 symptomatic (20%) imported cases, corresponding to a projected third quarter statewide 138 importation rate of 4.5 cases per day. 139 2. We defined county-specific import risk as the probability that the next imported case in Texas 140 will occur in that county. To build a predictive model for import risk, we fit a probabilistic model 141
(maximum entropy) [ (Tables S3-S4) . 159
160

Estimating County Transmission Risk 161
The risk of ZIKV emergence following an imported case will depend on the likelihood of 162 mosquito-borne local transmission. For each Texas county, we used the Ross-Macdonald formulation to 163 estimate the ZIKV reproduction number (R 0 ), which is the average number of secondary infections caused 164 by the introduction of a single infectious individual into a fully susceptible population (Supplement §1.2) 165
[27]. To parameterize the model (Table S5) , we used mosquito life history estimates from a combination 166 of DENV and ZIKV studies and estimates of Ae. aegypti abundance for each county [6] . For parameters 167 that are sensitive to temperature (i.e., mosquito mortality and the extrinsic incubation period), we adjusted 168 the mosquito parameters using average reported Texas county temperatures for the month of August [25] . 169
Given the uncertainty in using DENV and ZIKV parameters from experimental and field studies from 170 other localities, we have included a sensitivity analysis in Supplement §4 to explore upper and lower 171 bounds of absolute values with changes in the average parameter values. 172
173
ZIKV Outbreak Simulation Model 174
To transmit ZIKV, a mosquito must bite an infected human, the mosquito must get infected with 175 the virus, and then the infected mosquito must bite a susceptible human. We assumed that mosquito-borne 176 transmission would be the main driver of epidemic dynamics, so we did not include sexual transmission 177 in our model. Rather than explicitly model the full transmission cycle, we aggregated the two-part cycle 178 of ZIKV transmission (mosquito-to-human and human-to-mosquito) into a single exposure period where 179 the individual has been infected by ZIKV, but not yet infectious, and do not explicitly model mosquitos. 180
For the purposes of this study, we need only ensure that the model produces a realistic human-to-human 181 generation time of ZIKV transmission. 182
The resultant model thus follows a Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered (SEIR) 183 transmission process stemming from a single ZIKV infection using a Markov branching process model 184 (Fig S2) . The temporal evolution of the compartments is governed by daily probabilities of infected 185 individuals transitioning between S, E, I, and R states, and new ZIKV cases arising from importations or 186 autochthonous transmission (Table S6) For each county risk scenario, defined by a specified importation rate, transmission rate, and 217 reporting rate, we ran 10,000 stochastic simulations. Each simulation began with a single imported 218 infectious case and terminated either when there were no individuals left in either the Exposed or 219
Infectious classes or the cumulative number of autochthonous infections reached 2,000. We classified 220 simulations as either epidemics or self-limiting outbreaks; epidemics were all simulations that fulfilled 221 two criteria: reached 2,000 cumulative autochthonous infections and had a maximum daily prevalence 222 (which we defined as the number of current infectious cases) exceeding 50 autochthonous cases (Fig S3) . 223
The second criterion distinguishes simulations resulting in large self-sustaining outbreaks (that achieve 224 substantial peaks) from those that accumulate infections through a series of small, independently sparked 225 clusters (that fail to reach the daily prevalence threshold). The latter occurs occasionally under low R 0 s 226 and high importation rates scenarios. 227
For simulations resulting in epidemics, the cumulative reported autochthonous infections may 228 include cases from several co-occurring or proximate transmission clusters, as might occur in actual 229 outbreaks. To verify that our simulations do not aggregate cases from clusters with clear temporal 230 separation, we calculated the distribution of times between sequential cases (Fig S4) . In our simulated 231 epidemics, almost all sequentially occurring cases occur within 14 days of each other, consistent with the 232 CDC's threshold for identifying local transmission events (based on the estimated maximum duration of 233 the ZIKV incubation period) [19] . 234 235
Outbreak Analysis 236
Policymakers must often make decisions in the face of uncertainty, such as when and where to 237 initiate ZIKV interventions. Our stochastic framework allows us to provide real-time county-level risk 238 assessments as reported cases accumulate. For each county, we found the probability that an outbreak will 239 progress into an epidemic (reach 2,000 cases with a maximum daily prevalence over 50), as a function of 240 the number of reported cases. We call this epidemic risk. To solve for epidemic risk in a county following 241 the xth reported autochthonous case, we first find all simulations (of 10,000 total) that experience at least 242 x reported autochthonous cases, and then calculate the proportion of those that are ultimately classified as 243 epidemics. For example, consider a county in which 1,000 of 10,000 simulated outbreaks reach at least 244 two reported autochthonous cases; the remaining 9,000 simulations dissipate with only one or zero case 245
reports. If only 50 of the 1,000 simulations ultimately fulfill the two epidemic criteria, then the estimated 246 epidemic risk following two reported cases in that county would be 5%. This simple classification scheme 247 performs quite well, only rarely misclassifying a string of small outbreaks as an epidemic, with the 248 probability of such an error increasing with the importation rate. For example, epidemics should not occur 249 when R 0 =0.9. If the importation rate is high, however, overlapping series of moderate outbreaks may 250 occasionally meet the two epidemic criteria. Even under the highest importation rate we considered (0.3 251 cases/day), only 1% of outbreaks were misclassified. 252
This method can be applied to evaluate universal triggers (like the recently recommended two-253 case trigger) or derive robust triggers based on local importation and transmission risks as well as the risk 254 tolerance of public health agencies. For example, if a policymaker would like to initiate interventions as 255 soon as the risk of an epidemic reaches 30%, we would simulate local ZIKV transmission and solve for 256 the number of reported cases at which the probability of an epidemic first exceeds 30%. Generally, the 257 recommended triggers decrease as the policymaker threshold for action decreases (for example, 258 policymakers would act sooner (fewer reported cases) for a 10% versus 30% threshold) and as the local 259 transmission potential increases (e.g. R 0 = 1.5 versus R 0 = 1.2). A policymaker wishing to trigger 260 interventions early, upon even a low probability of epidemic spread, has a low tolerance for failing to 261 intervene but may waste resources on unnecessary interventions; a policymaker willing to wait longer, 262 has a higher risk tolerance, but may implement interventions too late in the course of the outbreak. 263
County Uncertainty Analysis 265
We took two approaches to addressing uncertainty in the model parameters. First, we conducted a 266 sensitivity analysis to address the considerable uncertainty regarding several inputs into our estimation of 267 R 0 , including mosquito biology, ZIKV epidemiology, and human-mosquito interactions (Supplement §4). 268
For most factors, the county estimates of R 0 simply scale linearly with changes in the factor. However, 269 county-specific human-mosquito contact rates can change relative county risks based on assumptions 270 regarding the socioeconomic effect on human-mosquito interactions (Fig S6-7) , and county risk moves 271 southward as the summer heat subsides (Fig S8) . Second, given the considerable uncertainty regarding 272 ZIKV epidemiology, we examined a scenario where the absolute values of both R 0 and importation rate 273 are unknown, but lie within plausible ranges for Texas. To do so, we randomly sampled 10,000 274 simulations from the high risk Texas county outbreaks (counties with estimates of R 0 >1), creating an 275 amalgamous high risk county, and completed the outbreak analysis as we do with individual counties. 276
277
Results
278
To develop a ZIKV risk assessment framework for Texas counties, we first estimate county-level 279
ZIKV importation and transmission rates for August 2016. ZIKV importation risk within Texas is 280
predicted by variables reflecting urbanization, mobility patterns, and socioeconomic status (Table S3) , 281 and is concentrated in metropolitan counties of Texas (Fig 2A) . The two highest risk counties--Harris, 282 which includes Houston and has an estimated 27% chance of receiving the next imported Texas case, and 283
Travis, which includes Austin and has a 10% chance of the next importation--contain international 284 airports. Other high risk regions include Brazos County, the Dallas and San Antonio metropolitan areas, 285 and several counties along the Texas-Mexico border. 286 
291
and yellow increasing to red counties indicate R 0 s > 1 (See Fig S7-11 for sensitivity analysis).
293
Our county-level estimates of autochthonous ZIKV transmission risk (Fig 2B) suggest that the 294 majority of Texas counties (87%) have an estimated R 0 below one, and thus are unlikely to sustain 295 epidemics. The Southeast region of Texas has the highest estimated transmission risk, driven primarily by 296 high mosquito habitat suitability. These estimates are sensitive to uncertainty in several parameters (Fig  297   S7-11) , and can be updated as we learn more about ZIKV. While the average transmission risk may be 298 higher or lower than our baseline assumption, and certainly varies seasonally, the relative high and low 299 risks areas of the state are robust (Fig S7-11) , and allow us to conduct plausible case studies and identify 300 at risk areas for enhanced surveillance and preparedness efforts. However given the uncertainty 301 underlying specific county R 0 estimates, we also aggregate the 21 highest absolute estimates into a 302 plausible distribution for any high risk Texas county, ranging from R 0 = 1.0 to R 0 = 2.2 with a median of 303
304
Under a single set of epidemiological conditions, wide ranges of outbreaks are possible (Fig 3A) . 305
The relationship between what policymakers can observe (cumulative reported cases) and what they wish 306 to know (current underlying disease prevalence) can be obscured by such uncertainty, and will depend 307 critically on both the transmission and reporting rates (Fig 3B) . If key drivers, such as R 0 , can be 308 estimated with confidence, then the breadth of possibilities narrows, enabling more precise surveillance. 309
For example, under a known high risk R 0 scenario and with a 20% reporting rate, ten linked cumulative 310 autochthonous reported cases corresponds to 6 currently circulating cases with a 95% CI of 1-16; under 311 an unknown but high risk R 0 scenario, the same number of cases corresponds to an expected daily 312 prevalence of 10 cases with a much wider 95% CI of 2-32 (Fig 3B) . 
322
there is a 64% probability of an ensuing epidemic.
324
We apply our model to characterize time-varying epidemic risk as cases accumulate in a given 325 county. Under both a known and unknown high risk scenario, we track the probability of epidemicexpansion following each additional reported case (Fig 3C) . Across the full range of reported cases, the 327 probability of epidemic spread is always higher in the unknown, compared with the known high risk 328
scenario showing more sensitivity to the reporting rate. These curves can support both real-time risk 329 assessment as cases accumulate and the identification of surveillance triggers indicating when risk 330 exceeds a specified threshold. For example, suppose a policymaker wanted to initiate an intervention 331 upon two reported cases and thought the reporting rate was 20%, this would correspond with a 64% 332 probability of an epidemic in the unknown high risk county but only 35% in the known high risk county. 333
Alternatively suppose a policy maker wishes to initiate an intervention when the chance of an epidemic 334 exceeds 50%. In the unknown high risk scenario, they should act immediately following the 1st 335 autochthonous reported case; in the known high risk scenario, the corresponding trigger ranges from two 336 to seven autochthonous reported cases, depending on the reporting rate. As the policymaker's threshold 337 (risk tolerance) increases, the recommended surveillance triggers can be adjusted accordingly. 338
To evaluate a universal intervention trigger of two reported autochthonous cases, we estimate 339 both the probability of a trigger event (two such cases) in each county and the level of epidemic risk at the 340 moment a trigger event occurs (second case reported) in each county. Assuming a baseline importation 341 rate extrapolated from recent importations to August 2016 and a 20% reporting rate, only a minority of 342 counties are likely to experience a trigger event (Fig 4A) . While 231 of the 254 counties (91%) have non-343 zero probabilities of experiencing two reported autochthonous cases, only 63 counties have at least a 10% 344 chance of such an event, with the remaining 168 counties having a median probability of 0.017 (range 345 0.0004 to 0.089). Next, assuming that a second autochthonous case has indeed been reported, we find that 346 the underlying epidemic risk varies widely among the 231 counties, with most counties having near zero 347 epidemic probabilities and a few counties far exceeding a 50% chance of epidemic expansion. For 348 example, two reported autochthonous cases in Starr County, along the Texas-Mexico border, correspond 349 to a 99% chance of ongoing transmission that would proceed to epidemic proportions without 350 intervention. The greater San Antonio metropolitan region appears to be the highest risk metropolitan 351 region with four of its eight counties having a higher than 25% probability of experiencing two reported 352 autochthonous cases; in those four counties, the epidemic risk upon detection of a second case ranges 353 from 19-90%. Houston metropolitan region is also a high risk region with its second (Fort Bend) and 354 fourth (Brazoria) largest counties having a 39% and 45% chance of sustaining two reported 355 autochthonous cases, respectively, with corresponding epidemic risks of 67% and 86% thereafter. 
360
White counties never reach two reported cases across all 10,000 simulated outbreaks; light gray counties reach two cases, but 361 never experience epidemics. (C) Recommended county-level surveillance triggers (number of reported autochthonous cases)
362
indicating that the probability of epidemic expansion has exceeded 50%. White counties indicate that fewer than 1% of the 363 10,000 simulated outbreaks reached two reported cases. All three maps assume a 20% reporting rate and a baseline importation 
367
Given that a universal trigger may signal highly disparate levels of ZIKV risk, policy makers 368 might seek to adapt their triggers to local conditions. Suppose a policymaker wishes to design triggers 369 that indicate a 50% chance of an emerging epidemic (Fig 4C) . Under the baseline importation and 370 reporting rates, only 21 of the 254 counties in Texas are expected to reach a 50% epidemic probability, 371 with triggers ranging from one (Starr County) to 21 (Dimmit County) reported autochthonous cases, with 372 a median of two cases. The remaining counties have less than a 1% chance of experiencing sustained 373 ZIKV transmission. Under an elevated importation scenario, assuming that only one fifth of ZIKVimportations (the symptomatic proportion) have been observed, we find that the recommended triggers
